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We present a theory of unsecured consumer debt that recognizes a debtor's legal right to
default. Our theory does not rely on psychological costs of default (or stigma) nor does it
rely on enforcement mechanisms that arise in repeated-game settings. Our theory is based
on private information about a person's type and on a person's incentive to signal his type
by avoiding default in the credit market.
People in our model di®er with respect to patience and in the likelihood of an insurable (i.e.,
observable) loss. More patient types are assumed to be less likely to su®er the loss and these
(correlated) di®erences in patience and probability of loss are private information. Crucially,
in our model the opportunity to repay debt occurs at an earlier date than the opportunity
to purchase insurance. This means that debtors who are also good insurance risks have an
opportunity to signal their type by repaying debt. The signal works because the bene¯t of
a lower cost of insurance comes in the future and the type who is a good insurance risk is
also the type who values the future more.
Our theory is consistent with the well-known fact that the cost of some kinds of insurance is
positively related to the presence of derogatory information in a person's credit history. Our
theory also provides an example of the more general point that people avoid opportunistic
behavior in one social context because doing so has positive spillover e®ects in other social
contexts.1 Motivation
In this paper we construct a theory of unsecured debt that recognizes a debtor's legal right
to default - i.e. it recognizes the presence of a right to bankruptcy. The question we address
is the following: how can unsecured consumer debt coexist with the unilateral right of a
debtor to invoke bankruptcy?
We propose a theory of unsecured debt that is based on the existence of private informa-
tion about a person's type and on the fact that some debtors have the incentive to forego
bankruptcy in order to signal their type. The theory formalizes the intuitive notion that the
type of a person is likely to be relevant to trading partners in many exchange situations and
by resisting opportunistic behavior in one exchange context, a person may signal valuable
information about his type to trading partners in other exchange contexts.
Speci¯cally, people in our model di®er with respect to patience and in the likelihood of an
insurable loss. More patient types are also less likely to su®er the loss and these (correlated)
di®erences in patience and probability of loss are private information. To formalize the
information spillovers between markets, we assume the opportunity to repay debt occurs at
an earlier date in our model than the opportunity to purchase insurance. This means that
debtors who are also good insurance risks have the opportunity and incentive to signal their
type by repaying debt. The signal works because the bene¯t of a lower cost of insurance
comes in the future and the type who is a good insurance risk is also the type who values
the future more. In other words, patience makes for better insurance risk but it also makes a
person value the future more (relative to the present) and, therefore, lowers the opportunity
cost of giving out signals of being a better insurance risk { a signal that takes the form of
debt repayment. In our model, no credit is extended to a person if type is public information
or if all types are equally risky with respect to the insurable loss. In either case, there is no
reward to curtailing opportunistic behavior in the credit market.
It is worth noting that our theory of unsecured debt is distinct from some other approaches
1to explaining unsecured debt when enforcement is imperfect. Our theory does not rely on
enforcement mechanisms that depend on exclusion from the asset (loan or deposit) markets
following default. Indeed, our model has ¯nite-lived households to whom the opportunity to
borrow (and repay) is presented only once. Also, our theory does not depend on any psycho-
logical cost of failing to honor debt contracts - there is no stigma attached to bankruptcy.
Our paper is closely related to three earlier works. The ¯rst is Diamond's (1989) well-known
paper on acquisition of reputation in private debt markets. Diamond considers a situation
where there are two types of indivisible investment projects: one is safe and the other is risky
(including a state of the world where the project fails yielding zero output). Some in¯nitely-
lived risk-neutral entrepreneurs own the ¯rst type of project, others the second, and a third
group choose which project to undertake. To start the project requires some input which the
entrepreneurs borrow in a competitive loan market populated by one-period lived lenders.
The key friction is that project type is unobservable to the lender. Since an entrepreneur's
loss is bounded below by defaulting in the case of project failure, entrepreneurs in the third
group have an incentive to choose the risky project. In this environment, an entrepreneur's
payment history reveals information about his type and hence the terms of credit o®ered to
an entrepreneur will depend on that history. Since default only happens when the project
fails, the only choice for an entrepreneur from the third group is which type of project to
undertake.
The second two papers study sovereign debt. Cole, Dow and English (1995) focus on the
fact that because sovereign repayments cannot be enforced, governments might signal their
willingness to repay future loans by settling old debts. Governments in their model can be
one of two types, one being more myopic than the other. The government's type follows
a Markov process and type is unobservable. Governments borrow in order to ¯nance a
stochastic project yielding nonstorable output. As in the Diamond paper, lenders o®er one
period contracts which are contingent on a lender's belief as to the type of borrower he faces,
which is updated according to observed behavior in the asset market. The authors construct
2equilibria where the less myopic government pays o® debt, the more myopic one defaults
on its debt, and when a myopic government changes state it makes a payment to signal the
change. There are similarities between this paper and Chatterjee, et. al. (2005) except
for the di®erences associated with the legal system. For instance, a bankruptcy results in a
discharge of existing debt and individuals do not have the option of making a payment on
discharged debt in the future.1
Cole and Kehoe (1998) is the most closely related paper. In particular, they study a model
where a sovereign's actions in the debt market a®ect its reputation in a di®erent market (e.g.
the labor market). There are two di®erent types of risk neutral governments, where one
receives a large disutility (i.e. stigma) when it reneges on previous contracts. The country's
nonstorable goods production technology has deterministically °uctuating productivity and
the government must borrow to ¯nance the project. One period risk neutral lenders o®er
contracts that depend on the payment history of borrowers to maximize expected pro¯ts
and beliefs about type are updated according to Bayes' rule wherever possible. The authors
show that if there are no reputational spillovers, there can be no loan market activity but
once default in the credit market tarnishes the government's reputation in another market, it
is actually possible to support large amounts of debt when borrowers are su±ciently patient.
One key di®erence between our framework and theirs is that there is no stigma associated
with default. Hence we needn't revert to complicated limiting arguments (taking the prior
over stigma sensitive governments to zero) to study existence of equilibria.
Our theory is motivated by some features of the U.S. economy. First, bankruptcy is both
legal and pervasive. Second, credit histories are used both by the credit industry and by the
insurance industry (auto and home insurance) as indicators of good performance. People
with superior credit histories are o®ered credit and insurance at a cheaper price.2 In turn,
1Given the choice between Chapter 7 and 13, individuals would choose to ¯le Chapter 13 only if they
wished to keep assets they would lose under a Chapter 7 ¯ling. Since there is only one asset in our model,
borrowers have negative net worth and Chapter 7 is always the preferred means to ¯le for bankruptcy.
2According analysts (see http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/insurance/credit-scores1.asp), consumers
3they default less frequently and ¯le substantially fewer insurance claims.
2 Environment
There is a single good. There are 3 periods, denoted t = 1;2; and 3 and a unit measure of
people. We will describe people who live in this economy, the legal environment they face,
the market arrangement and the timing of events.
2.1 People
There are two types of people, denoted i = g;b: The measure of type g is 0 < ° < 1. The
preferences of each type is given by
E µ1u(c1) + ¯
i µ2u(c2) + ¯
i2
u(c3) (1)
where ct is consumption in period t of the single good and µt 2 £ ½ R is a preference shock
drawn independently for each person from the probability space f£;B(£);Ftg. The draws
are also assumed to be i.i.d. over time. The period utility function u(c) is taken to be strictly
concave and twice continuously di®erentiable. Observe that a person's type is assumed to
a®ect the person's discount factor. We assume that 1 > ¯g > ¯b > 0.
The endowment of all people is assumed to be a constant over time and given by e > 0.
In period 3, a person of type i faces a probability ¼i > 0 of experiencing a loss in wealth L > 0.
Thus, the probability of loss is taken to be exogenous but type-dependent. Speci¯cally,
0 < ¼g < ¼b < 1. We will denote the loss incurred by a person in period 3 by z 2 f0;Lg. We
we will denote the (discrete) probability space for z for type i by ff0;Lg;P(f0;Lg);Zig.
with bad credit scores pay 20 to 50 percent more in auto insurance premiums than consumers with high
credit scores. And, two-thirds of policy holders have lower premiums because of their good credit records.
4Finally, unless revealed by a person's actions, a person's type and the realizations of his
preference shocks are assumed to be private information.
2.2 Legal Environment
A key feature of the environment is the existence of a bankruptcy law. This law gives people
the right to disavow their ¯nancial obligations. As is generally true for actual bankruptcy
law, this \right to bankruptcy" is assumed to be inalienable { meaning that a debtor cannot
waive his or her right to bankruptcy at the time of taking out a loan. For simplicity, we
assume that invoking the right to bankruptcy does not cost the debtor any fees or expenses.
2.3 Market Arrangements
There are two sets of markets. In one market people borrow from or lend to banks and in the
other market people purchase insurance against the loss L. Since household type is private
information, and type will matter for the propensity of a person to declare bankruptcy or
su®er a loss, banks and insurance companies must make an assessment of a person's type
when selling a loan or an insurance policy.3 We will study a market structure that permits
the terms of ¯nancial contracts to depend on such an assessment. In what follows, we will
use ¾ as the generic symbol to denote the probability that a person is type g. Then ¾ is
the assessment of a person's type or, more succinctly, a person's type score. A person's type
score will evolve over time because a person's actions in the asset and insurance markets
can (and will) reveal information about a person's true type. We imagine that there is an
information processing agency (resembling real-world credit bureaus) that keeps track of a
person's actions in the asset and insurance markets { i.e. keeps track of a person's ¯nancial
3If the preference shocks are correlated over time then banks may also have an incentive to form an
assessment of the preference shock hitting a person because this information will be valuable in predicting
future default. Since we have assumed that shocks are i.i.d, this assessment is not necessary.
5history.
The asset market operates in periods 1 and 2 - there is obviously no role for an asset market
in period 3 since no one lives beyond period 3. In period 1, the asset market o®ers one-period
bond contracts y 2 A, where A is a compact subset of R. These bond contracts are o®ered
at prices q1(y;¾). A person with assessment ¾ who purchases the contract y pays q1(y;¾)¢y
in period 1 and receives y in period 2. A positive y signi¯es a deposit and a negative y
signi¯es a loan. If y < 0, the person promises to repay y in period 2 conditional on not
declaring bankruptcy. In period 2 we assume that people are permitted to borrow but not
save. The restriction on period 2 saving is made for tractability and is discussed later in
the paper.4 Thus the period 2 asset market o®ers one-period bond contracts y 2 A \ R¡ at
prices q2(y;¾). Again, default on period 2 loans is possible. Finally, we assume that banks
have access to a world credit market in which they borrow or save at the interest rate r.5
The insurance market in period 3 operates as follows. Insurers o®er contracts x in I, where
I is a compact subset of R. A person with assessment ¾ who purchases the contract x pays
p(x;¾) ¢ x as premium and, in the event of loss, collects the indemnity x. This notation
emphasizes the symmetry between the loan and insurance markets. Just as the probability
of default on a loan will depend on the size of the loan, so too can the probability of loss on
an insurance contract depend on the amount of insurance purchased { for the usual moral
hazard reasons. However, in this paper we abstract from issues of moral hazard issues { for
each type of person, the probability of loss cannot be a®ected by any action that the person
can take. Therefore, in equilibrium, the price of insurance will depend only ¾ and not x.
4In an actual Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, a person is required to relinquish available assets - with
some exceptions - to creditors when obtaining discharge of debt. If the exemptions are generous, a person
can discharge debt and accumulate substantial assets in the period of bankruptcy. By assuming that no
saving is permitted in period 2 we avoid having to take a stand on this point.
5Alternatively, we could imagine that banks have access to a storage technology that allows them to
transform 1 unit of output in period 1 into (1+r) units of output in period 2. This would require incorporating
the restriction that aggregate consumer assets cannot be negative.
6A ¯nancial ¯rm takes the set of contracts and prices fq1(y;¾);y 2 Ag; fq2(y;¾);y 2 A\R¡g
and fp(x;¾);x 2 Ig as given. Any given contract is viewed as a distinct ¯nancial product.
There is free-entry in the provision of each of these ¯nancial products. In equilibrium each
of these ¯nancial products will fetch zero pro¯ts in expectation.
An important feature of the environment is the possibility that a person's actions in the
asset and insurance markets may reveal information about a person's type. The possibility
of information transmission is captured by the following three belief-updating functions.
² The function s = ª1(`) gives the person's type score at the end of period 1 if the
person chooses asset level `.
² The function s0 = ª2(d;`0;`;s) gives a person's type score at the end of period 2 if
he starts period 2 with asset ` and type-score s and chooses a bankruptcy decision d
(d = 1 means ¯le for bankruptcy and d = 0 means no ¯ling) and an asset level `0.
² The function s00 = ª3(x;`0;s0) gives a person's type score if he starts period 3 with
debt `0 and type-score s0 and chooses an insurance level x.
Market participants take these functions as given just as they take the pricing functions
qt(y;¾) and p(x;¾) and the sets A and I as given. In this sense, the functions ªt are also
part of the market arrangement.6
2.4 The Timing of Events
The timing of events in each period is as follows.
At the start of period 1, people learn their type i and the realization of the preference shock
µ1. Then they choose how much to borrow or save. Then they consume and period 1 ends.
6Just as we do not model the Walrasian auctioneer, we do not model the \credit scoring agency" explicitly.
But of course, the existence of auctions and credit scoring companies motivate our market arrangement.
7At the start of period 2 people learn the realization of their preference shock µ2. If a person
borrowed in period 1, the person then chooses whether to default or not. After the default
decision is made, people choose whether to borrow or not. Then they consume and period
2 comes to an end.
At the start of period 3 people purchase insurance. Next, the shock z is realized and the
person receives the insurance payment if z = L. Then, if a person borrowed in period 2 the
person chooses whether to default or not. Finally, people consume and die.7
3 Decision Problems
In this section we describe the decision problem of people, insurers and banks.
3.1 People
It's convenient to start with the ¯nal period and work backwards.
3.1.1 Period 3
After insurers have paid o®, a person's decision problem is to choose whether to pay back




0(1 ¡ d) ¡ z ¡ p(x;s
00) ¢ x + x ¢ 1fz=Lg)
where `0 · 0 is the person's debt position at the start of period 3 (recall that no saving is
permitted in period 2) and s00 is the person's type-score following his purchase of insurance.
We will denote the decision rule for this problem by di(x;z;`0;s00). This decision rule of course
7An alternative model where periods 2 and 3 are lumped together and the timing is a default decision
followed by an insurance choice cannot support the type of equilibrium we describe later in the paper.
Therefore, a three period model seems the most parsimonious environment for the purposes of this paper.
8takes a very simple form: if `0 = 0 then di(x;z;`0;s00) = 0 and if `0 < 0 then di(x;z;`0;s00) = 1:
Because the default decision is taken after the insurance purchase has been made there is
no cost to defaulting on a loan.
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Observe that the set of insurance choices available to a person is allowed to depend on a
person's beginning of period 3 risk-assessment s0. Thus, for some s0 only a strict subset of
insurance contracts may be available. We will denote a type i person's decision rule regarding
insurance purchase as xi(`0;s0).
3.1.2 Period 2
At the start of period 2, people learn their preference shock µ2. If a person of type i is a
debtor and chooses to default, the person's utility is given by
V
i 1

















where ` is the person's beginning-of-period 2 asset position and s is the person's beginning-
period-of-period 2 risk assessment. If the person of type i chooses not to default, then the
9person's utility is given by
V
i 0

























We will denote a type i's period 2 decision rules as di(µ2;`;s) and `0i(µ2;`;s).
3.1.3 Period 1
At the start of period 1 people learn their type i and their preference shock µ1. The decision
problem of a person of type i is then
V
i








e ¡ q1(`;s) ¢ ` ¸ 0
s = ª1(`)
We will denote a type i's period 1 decision rule as `i(µ1).
3.2 Insurers
Insurers face a set of insurance contracts I and prices fp(x;¾);x 2 Ig. The decision problem
of insurers is to choose how many of these di®erent types of contracts to sell. Clearly insurers
will participate in selling any contract x 2 I that makes non-negative pro¯ts in expectation.
10That is if
p(x;¾) ¢ x ¸ ¾ ¢ ¼
g ¢ x + (1 ¡ ¾) ¢ ¼
b ¢ x:






In period t = 1;2, banks face a set of loan contracts A and prices fq1(y;¾);y 2 Ag and
fq2(y;¾);y 2 A\R¡g, respectively. As in the case of insurers, the decision problem of banks
is to choose how many of these di®erent types of contracts to sell. And, as in the case of
insurers, banks will participate in selling only those contracts that make non-negative pro¯ts
in expectation.
For y < 0, non-negative pro¯ts requires













where r is the risk-free rate available to banks and ¹i
t(y;¾) is the period-t probability that a
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For y > 0, non-negative pro¯ts require that
q1(y;¾) ¸ (1 + r)
¡1:
4 Equilibrium
We can now give the de¯nition of a competitive equilibrium.
11De¯nition A competitive equilibrium is (i) a set of loan prices q¤
t(y;¾), (ii) a set
of insurance prices p¤(x;¾), (iii) a set of default probabilities ¹i¤
t (y;¾), (iv) a set
of decision rules `i¤(µ1), `0i¤(µ2;`;s), di¤(µ2;`;s); xi¤(`0;s0) and di¤(x;z;`0;s0) and





1. For any given ¾, each loan y 2 A earns zero pro¯ts.
(a) For y ¸ 0 this requires
q
¤
1(y;¾) = (1 + r)
¡1
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3. Default probabilities are consistent with decision rules.




















4. The decision rules solve each household type's optimization problem given
the pricing functions q¤





125. Updating functions are consistent with decision rules and satisfy Bayes' Rule
whenever possible. To state these conditions, de¯ne Hi¤
1 (`) = fµ1 : `i¤(µ1) =
`g and Hi¤



















provided the denominator is positive { that is, provided a positive mea-





























s0 ¢ 1fxg¤(`0;s0)=xg + (1 ¡ s0) ¢ 1fxb¤(`0;s0)=xg
provided, again, the denominator is positive.
We can use this de¯nition to establish a simple property of every competitive equilibrium,
namely, that there cannot be any lending in period 2.
Proposition 1. For all ¾, q¤
2(y;¾) = 0 for any y < 0 and `0i¤(µ2;`;s) = 0.
Proof. Observe that, as noted earlier, di¤(x;z;y;s00) = 1 whenever y < 0.
Hence, it follows from part 3(b) that ¹i¤
2 (y;¾) = 1 for i = g;b and from part 1(b)
that q¤
2(y;¾) = 0: Since loan prices are zero, `0i¤(µ2;`;s) = 0 is consistent with
household optimization.
13¤
This result comes from the assumption that the default decision is taken after the insurance
purchase is made. Since there are no other market transactions that people engage in after
the insurance market closes, there is no reason whatsoever to repay a loan. If the insurance
purchase followed the default decision, the debtor would have to take account of any adverse
change in the market's assessment of his or her type resulting from opportunistic behavior.
Indeed, this is the channel through which it may be possible to constrain opportunistic
behavior with regard to loans taken out in period 1 because for these loans the insurance
purchase will follow the default decision. It is to this possibility that we now turn.
5 An Environment with Binary Choices
In this section, we consider a simple but illuminating special case of the general environment
described in the previous section. First, £ is restricted to be f1;µg, where µ > 1. We assume
that F1(1) = 1 ¡ Á and F2(1) = 1, { that is, the period 2 distribution of µ is degenerate at
µ = 1 but there is probability Á > 0 that µ > 1 in period 1. Second, asset choice is restricted
to a loan and deposit of a single size a { that is A = f¡a;0;ag: Third, insurance choice is
restricted to full insurance only { that is I = f0;Lg:
We consider an equilibrium with the following properties. All type b households take out a
loan regardless of their preference shock. Among type g households only those with the high
preference shock take out a loan and others save. All type g households who borrow pay
back their loans in period 2 and purchase insurance at the cheapest price in period 3. All
type b borrowers default in period 2 and purchase insurance at the highest price in period 3.
The equilibrium clari¯es the precise conditions under which \good behavior" in the credit
market can be supported by superior treatment of \well-behaved" borrowers in the insurance
market.
14To establish an equilibrium with these features, the following ¯ve assumptions on primitives
are su±cient.
Assumption 1 Su±ciently High Risk Aversion:
¼
gu(e ¡ L) + (1 ¡ ¼
g)u(e) < u(e ¡ ¼
bL):
The inequality asserts that type g households prefer to purchase insurance even if the
insurance is o®ered at a price that is appropriate for the type b households. Clearly
this requirement is a restriction on curvature of the u function { the function must be
su±ciently concave.
Assumption 2 Type g are Su±ciently Patient and Type b are Su±ciently Impatient:
¯
g >
u(e) ¡ u(e ¡ a)




















Note that the terms on the r.h.s. of these inequalities are positive so it is always
possible to choose strictly positive ¯i to satisfy them. It is possible that ¯g would need
to be larger than 1 but in the ¯nite horizon context this is not an issue. Note however
that we require ¯b to be strictly less than 1.











g [u(e) ¡ u(e ¡ a)]:
Observe that for any given u function and any admissible values of other parameters,
the inequality is satis¯ed strictly for Á = 0. Therefore, by continuity, the inequality
can always be satis¯ed for a positive Á su±ciently small.












g [u(e) ¡ u(e ¡ a)]:
15Since 0 < ° < 1, the term (Á°a)=(Á° + 1 ¡ °)(1 + r)) is positive. Therefore for any
given u function and any (admissible) values of the other parameters, a µ > 1 can be
chosen su±ciently high to satisfy the inequality.
Then we have the following.
Proposition 2 Given Assumptions 1-4 the following functions constitute an
competitive equilibrium
² Pricing Functions and Default Probabilities
1. For all ¾, q¤
1(a;¾) = 1=(1 + r), q¤
1(¡a;¾) = ¾=(1 + r), and q¤
2(¡a;¾) = 0.
2. For all ¾, p¤(x;¾) = ¼b ¡ ¾[¼b ¡ ¼g] for x 2 f0;Lg
3. For all ¾, ¹
g¤
1 (¡a;¾) = 0, ¹b¤
1 (¡a;¾) = 1, and ¹i¤
2 (¡a;¾) = 1.
² Decision Rules
1. `b¤(µ1) = ¡a for all µ1 2 £, `g¤(µ1) = ¡a if µ1 = µ and a otherwise, and
`0i¤(µ2;`;s) = 0 for all (`;s) and i.
2. db¤(µ2;`;s) = 1 if ` = ¡a and 0 otherwise, dg¤(µ2;`;s) = 0, and di¤(x;z;`0;s00) = 1.
3. xi¤(`0;s0) = L
² Belief-Updating Functions
1. ª¤
1(¡a) = (Á°)=(Á° + 1 ¡ °), ª¤
1(0) = °, and ª¤
1(a) = 1
2. For `0 2 f0;¡ag, ª¤
2(0;`0;a;s) = s, ª¤
2(0;`0;0;s) = s, ª¤
2(0;`0;¡a;s) = 1 and
ª¤
2(1;`0;¡a;s) = 0,
3. For `0 2 f0;¡ag, ª¤
3(0;`0;s0) = s0 and ª¤
3(L;`0;s0) = s0.
16Proof The proof involves checking that these functions satisfy each of the con-
ditions in parts 1 through 6 of the de¯nition of a competitive equilibrium.
It is easy to verify that given the default probabilities, the asset-market zero pro¯t
conditions in part 1 are satis¯ed. Also, the insurance-market zero pro¯t condition
in part 2 is (trivially) satis¯ed. It is also easy to verify that default probabilities
are consistent with default decision rules, as required by the conditions in part
3.
Next we will verify that given the decision rules, the belief-updating functions
satisfy Bayes' Rule whenever applicable. Recall that the fraction of type g in
the population is ° 2 (0;1) and any person has a probability Á > 0 of drawing
µ1 = µ. Consider ¯rst the function ª¤

































1 (0))gdF1(µ1) = (1 ¡ Á)°
Therefore, for ` 2 f¡a;ag, ª¤
1(`) satis¯es the conditions in part 5(a). But for ` =




0 for all i = fg;bg. In this case, Bayes Rule is not applicable and any assignment
of beliefs is legitimate. We assume that a choice of ` = 0 is uninformative about
a person's true type.
Now consider the function ª¤
2(d;`0;`;s). For (`;s) 2 f0;ag £ [0;1], the decision
rules imply that everyone chooses (d;`0) = (0;0) regardless of their µ2 (actu-
ally there is no uncertainty with regard to µ2 which always takes the value 1).










2 (0;0;`;s)gdF2(µ2) + (1 ¡ s)
Z
1fµ22Hb¤
2 (0;0;`;s)gdF2(µ2) = 1
For ` = ¡a, the decision rules imply that type g choose (d;`0) = (0;0) regardless










2 (0;0;¡a;s)gdF2(µ2) + (1 ¡ s)
Z
1fµ22Hb¤











2 (1;0;¡a;s)gdF2(µ2) + (1 ¡ s)
Z
1fµ22Hb¤
2 (1;0;¡a;s)gdF2(µ2) = (1 ¡ s)
Finally, for all (`;s) and d and i, it is the case that
R
£ 1fµ22Hi¤
2 (d;¡a;`;s)gdF2(µ2) = 0,
since the decision rules imply that no one chooses (d;¡a).
These conditions taken together imply that for s 2 (0;1) and `0 = 0, ª¤
2(d;`0;`;s)
satis¯es all the conditions in part 5(b). For s = 1 and (d;`0) = (1;0) the require-
ment in 5(b) leads to the indeterminacy (0/0). The value assigned is reasonable
in the sense that ª¤
2(1;0;¡a;1) = lims!1ª¤
2(1;0;¡a;s). Similarly, for s = 0
and (d;`0) = (0;0) the requirement in 5(b) leads to an indeterminacy. In this
case, ª¤
2(0;0;¡a;0) = lims!0ª¤
2(0;0;¡a;s). Finally, for `0 = ¡a, the require-
ment also leads to an indeterminacy { in this case we assume that this action is
uninformative about a person's type and set ª¤
2(d;¡a;`;s) = s for all (`;s) and
d.
Finally, consider the function ª¤
3(x;`0;s0). For any `0 2 A \ R¡ and any s0,
the decision rules imply that everyone chooses x = L. Therefore, for (`0;s0) 2
18fA [ R¡g £ [0;1],
s
0 ¢ 1fxg¤(`0;s0)=Lg = s
0
s
0 ¢ 1fxg¤(`0;s0)=Lg + (1 ¡ s
0) ¢ 1fxb¤`0;s0)=Lg = 1
and
s
0 ¢ 1fxg¤(`0;s0)=0g = 0
s
0 ¢ 1fxg¤(`0;s0)=0g + (1 ¡ s
0) ¢ 1fxb¤(`0;s00=)g = 0
These expressions imply that for all (`0;s0) 2 fA \ R¡g £ (0;1), ª¤
3(L;`0;s0)
satis¯es the requirements in part 5(c). For s0 equal to 0 or 1, the requirements
lead to (0=0). In these cases, we assume that lims0!0 or 1 = ª¤
3(L;`0;s0) = s0. For
x = 0, (and all (`0;s0)) the requirements also lead to the indeterminacy (0/0). In
this case we assume that the action is uninformative about a person's true type,
i.e., ª¤
3(0;`0;s0) = s0.
Next, we need to verify that the decision rules are the optimal decision rules given
the pricing functions q¤
t and p¤ and the belief-updating functions ª¤
t. Consider
¯rst the optimal choice of insurance in period 3. For a household of type i in
state (`0;s0), the expected utility from choosing x = 0 is ¼iu(e¡L)+(1¡¼i)u(e)







iu(e ¡ L) + (1 ¡ ¼
i)u(e) for all s
0:










The optimal value in the ¯nal period is independent of `0 and increasing in s0.
Observe that independence from `0 follows from the fact that people cannot save
and that if anyone arrived in the ¯nal period with debt then it is always optimal
to default on that debt.
19Next consider the decision rules in period 2. First, consider people (of any type)
with (`;s) 2 f0;ag£[0;1]. Observe that for such people (0;0) weakly dominates
(0;¡a). This follows because (i) choosing ¡a does not a®ect period-2 budget
constraint since loan prices are zero, (ii) does not lead to an s0 that is di®erent
from the s0 that results from choosing (d;0) and (iii) V i
3(`0;s0) is independent of
`0. Therefore, it is (weakly) optimal for such people to choose (d;`0) = (0;0).
Consider now a person of type i with ` = ¡a and assessment s. If this person
chooses (d;`0) = (1;0) then by the belief-updating function ª¤
2 he will start period
3 with s0 = 0 and if he chooses (d;`) = (0;0) then by the belief-updating function
he will start period 3 with s0 = 1. Recognizing that µ2 is always 1 (i.e there are




2 (1;¡a;s) = u(e) + ¯




2 (1;¡a;s) = u(e ¡ a) + ¯
i u(e ¡ ¼
gL):
By Assumption 2, it follows that the optimal choice for a type-g household with
debt is (d;`0) = (0;0) regardless of s. Assumption 2 also implies that the optimal
choice for a type-b household with debt is (d;`0) = (1;0) regardless of s. To
see this note that if y < e and ³ < 1 then for any strictly concave function u,
u(y + a) ¡ u(y) > u(e + ³a) ¡ u(e). The result follows by taking y = e ¡ a and
³ = (Á°)=(Á° + (1 ¡ °)).
Finally, consider the decision rules in period 1. Households of either type must




1(¡a;¾) = ¾=(1 + r), q
¤
1(0;¾) = 1=(1 + r)







(Á°)=(Á° + 1 ¡ °) if ` = ¡a
1 if ` = 0
20From these equations it follows that anyone who does not borrow in period 1 will
start period 2 with s0 = 1 and anyone who borrows in period 1 will do so at the
price (Á°)=[(1+r)¢(Á°+1¡°)] and will start period 2 with s0 = (Á°)=(Á°+1¡°).
Consider ¯rst a household of type g with µ1 = 1. From our earlier demonstration
that indebted type-g households always choose to pay back in period 2 and
(consequently) purchase insurance at the price ¼g in period 3, it follows that the
life-time utility of such a household from choosing to borrow is
V
g











On the other hand, if such a household chooses not to borrow then he will start
period 2 with s0 = 1 and consequently will, again, purchase insurance in the
period 3 at the price ¼g. Therefore, the lifetime utility of such a household from
choosing not to borrow is
V
g
1 (1)`=0 = u(e) + ¯
g u(e) + (¯
g)
2 u(e ¡ ¼
gL)
It follows from Assumption 3 that a type-g household with µ1 = 1 will choose not
to borrow. Now consider a type-g household with µ1 = µ. For such a household
the lifetime utility from choosing to borrow is
V
g











and the lifetime utility of such a household from choosing not to borrow is
V
g
1 (µ)`=0 = µu(e) + ¯
g u(e) + (¯
g)
2 u(e ¡ ¼
gL)
It follows from Assumption 4 that such a household will choose to borrow. Hence
`g(µ1) = ¡a for µ1 = µ and `g(µ1) = 0 for µ = 1 is the optimal decision rule.
Consider next a household of type b with µ1 = 1. From our earlier demon-
stration that an indebted household of type b defaults regardless of his s and
21(consequently) purchases insurance in period 3 at the price ¼b, it follows that the
lifetime utility of such a household from choosing to borrow is
V
b




(1 + r)(Á° + 1 ¡ °)
¶
+ ¯
b u(e) + (¯
b)
2 u(e ¡ ¼
bL)
On the other hand, if such a household chooses not to borrow then he will start
period 2 with s0 = 1 and will consequently purchase insurance in the period 3
at the price ¼g. Therefore, the lifetime utility of such a household from choosing
not to borrow is
V
b
1 (1)`=0 = u(e) + ¯
b u(e) + (¯
b)
2 u(e ¡ ¼
gL)
It follows from Assumption 2, in particular the fact that ¯b < 1, that the optimal
choice for this household is to borrow. Furthermore, it should be clear that if a
type-b household with µ1 = 1 ¯nds it optimal to borrow then a type-b household
with µ1 = µ > 1 would also ¯nd it optimal to borrow. Hence the optimal decision
rule for a type-b household is `b(µ1) = ¡a for all µ1 2 £.
¤
Corollary. If type is observable, or if ¼g = ¼b, then q¤
1(`;¾) = 0:
Proof. If type is observable then in period 3, full insurance is available to type
g and b at prices ¼g and ¼b respectively. In period 2, it is a strictly optimal for
both types to default since defaulting yields utility u(e) + ¯iu(e ¡ ¼iL) and not
defaulting yields utility u(e ¡ a) + ¯iu(e ¡ ¼iL) where a > 0. Since both types
default with certainty, the price of loans is zero. If type is not observable but
¼g = ¼b = ¼; then again full insurance is available to both types at the price ¼
and once again it is strictly optimal to for both types to default in period 2.
¤
22It is worth noting that the equilibrium has properties that match features of the data. If
we interpret ¾ as a person's credit score (i.e., a credit score is simply an assessment that a
person is of type-g) then the equilibrium implies that (i) when people default their credit
scores decline and (ii) people with a low credit scores get worse insurance rates and are, on
average, more likely to ¯le a claim.
6 An Environment with Signalling in the Insurance
Market
When people are only o®ered a choice between full insurance and no insurance, a standard
means of signalling one's type is unavailable. Namely, the good insurance risks do not
have the option of signalling their low-risk status by accepting limited insurance and thereby
receiving insurance at a cheaper rate. Of course, such mechanisms are ubiquitous in insurance
markets. It is important, therefore, to investigate if the inability of people to signal their
type in the insurance market is critical to the results derived in Proposition 2. The upshot of
this section is that the possibility of signalling one's type by taking limited insurance makes
it harder, but not impossible, for the period 1 loan market to function.
The microeconomic literature on the provision of insurance indicates that for a population
with two hidden types, competition among insurers will result in one of two kinds of equi-
librium - pooling or separating. In a pooling equilibrium insurers o®er one full-insurance
contract at a price that re°ects the composition of low- and high-risk types in the popula-
tion. In a separating equilibrium insurers o®er two contracts, one with limited insurance at
a low price designed to attract only the low-risk types and another with full insurance at a
higher price for the remaining high-risk types.
An important insight of the microeconomic insurance literature is that competitive insurers
have an incentive to break away from pooling contracts. In a pooling contract on which
23insurers make zero pro¯ts, the low-risk types must subsidize the high-risk types since both
types pay the same price but the high-risk types have a higher probability of loss. Because
of this subsidy from low-risk to high-risk types, insurers have an incentive to entice away the
low-risk types by o®ering them less-than-full-insurance at a price that is below the pooling
contract price but above the price that would be actuarially fair for low-risk types. Since low-
risk types receive insurance at an actuarially unfair price in a pooling contract, a pro¯table
limited-insurance contract generally exists. However, in a signi¯cant early contribution to
this literature, Wilson (1977) noted that this logic overlooks an important point, namely,
that once the low-risk types are enticed away by an attractively priced limited-insurance
contract, the pooling contract becomes unavailable to the high-risk types. Consequently, for
the enticement strategy to succeed the high-risk types must not ¯nd it in their interest to pool
with the low-risk types (and accept limited insurance) when the alternative is purchasing
full insurance at a non-subsidized price. This incentive of high-risk types to \re-pool" with
the low-risk types is most intense when the pool contains relatively few high-risk types. In
this case the price of insurance in the limited-insurance contract cannot be too much below
the price of insurance in the original pooling contract and therefore the insurance o®ered at
the lower price cannot be too much below full insurance. Such a contract will appear quite
attractive to a high-risk type whose alternative is to purchase somewhat more insurance at
a potentially much higher price.
In the context of this paper, Wilson's insight translates into the following observation. The
kinds of insurance opportunities a person will face will depend on the person's type-score
(or risk assessment) s0. A type-g person with a low s0 is in a pool that is mostly composed
of type-b people. Since the type-g's are the low-risk types, the standard separating contract
argument suggests that the type-g people in this pool can be pro¯tably o®ered the option of
cheap but limited insurance. In contrast, a type-g person with a high s0 is in a pool composed
of mostly the low-risk types and Wilson's insight suggests that their insurance choices will
be limited only to the appropriate pooling contract.
24We now develop this observation in formal detail. The focus is to determine the best separat-
ing insurance contract, if any, that can be o®ered to attract the low-risk types in a given pool
of people with type-score ¾. In what follows we will ¯nd it convenient to denote an insurance
contract as a pair (X;m), where X is the indemnity, m is the price per unit of insurance
(so that the premium on the contract is m ¢ X). We will denote the utility of a type i from
purchasing a contract (X;m) by W i(X;m) = ¼iu(e ¡ mX ¡ L + X) + (1 ¡ ¼i)u(y ¡ mX).8
Lemma 1 There exists a unique 0 < X < L such that W b(X;¼g)= W b(L;¼b).
Proof Since ¼g < ¼b it's clear that W b(X = L;¼g) > W b(L;¼b). And, by
virtue of the strict concavity of u, no-insurance is worse than full-insurance at
an actuarially fair price so W b(X = 0;¼g) < W b(L;¼b). Clearly W b(X;¼g) is a
continuous function of X 2 [0;L]. Therefore the existence of X 2 (0;L) follows
from the Intermediate Value Theorem. Uniqueness of X follows from the fact
that W b(X;¼g) is strictly increasing in X since insurance is being o®ered at a
price that is lower than the probability of loss.
¤
Since W b(X;¼g) is strictly increasing in X, X has the interpretation of being the most
generous actuarially fair insurance that can be o®ered to type-g people who are in a pool
of people with type-score ¾ 2 [0;1] without necessarily attracting the type-b people in the
pool.
Lemma 2 Let m(¾) = ¼b ¡ ¾[¼b ¡ ¼g]. Then, for any ¾ 2 [0;1] there exists a
unique x(¾) 2 [0;L] such that [W g(x(¾);¼g)¡W g(L;m(¾))]¢x(¾) = 0. Further-
more x(¾) is a continuous and weakly increasing in ¾.
Proof First, observe that W g(X;¼g) is clearly continuous in X and, because
the price of the insurance is actuarially fair, it is strictly increasing in X. Con-
sider ¯rst the case where ¾ = 1. Clearly a unique x(1) exists and is equal to
8Since no savings is permitted in period 2, the beginning of period resources of every consumer is e.
25L. Next consider any ¾ 2 [0;1). Then W g(X = L;¼g) > W g(L;m(¾)) because
¼g < m(¾). Now two cases can arise: (i) W g(X = 0;¼g) < W g(L;m(¾)), in
which case a unique x(¾) 2 (0;L) exists by the continuity and monotonicity of
W g(X;¼g); or (ii) W g(X = 0;¼g) ¸ W g(L;m(¾)) in which case a unique x(¾)
exists and is equal to 0.
From the continuity of W g(X;¼g) with respect to X, the continuity of m(¾) with
respect to ¾, and the continuity of W g(L;m) with respect to m, it follows that
x(¾) is a continuous function of ¾ 2 [0;1]. Furthermore, W g(L;m(¾)) is strictly
increasing in ¾ because m(¾) is strictly decreasing in ¾. Since W g(X;¼g) is also
strictly increasing in X, one may easily verify that the x(¾) has the following
form: either x(¾) is strictly increasing over the entire range ¾ 2 [0;1], or, x(¾) = 0
for all ¾ · ¾0 and strictly increasing for all ¾ > ¾0 where ¾0 is some value in
[0;1]. Hence x(¾) is weakly increasing in ¾.
¤
Since W g(X;¼g) is strictly increasing in X, x(¾) has the interpretation of being the least
generous actuarially fair insurance that can be o®ered to type-g people who are in a pool of
people with wealth y and type-score ¾ without giving the type-g in the pool a strict incentive
to choose the full-insurance contract o®ered at the price m(¾).
Given the interpretations of X and x(¾), it follows that if X < x(¾), the low-risk (type-g)
people who are in a pool of people with assessment ¾ cannot be o®ered a separating contract
they would actually want to take. The reason is because the least generous separating
contract that type-g would weakly prefer over the full-insurance pooling contract requires
a greater level of insurance than is consistent with keeping the type-b people from also
accepting the same contract. In contrast, if x(¾) = X then a separating contract that type-g
would (weakly!) prefer over the pooling contract exists and is given by (X;¼g): Similarly, if
x(¾) < X then in¯nitely many separating contracts exist, including the contract (X;¼g).
26We can now state the following important result.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique ¾¤ 2 (0;1) such that type-g people who
are in a pool composed of people with risk assessment ¾ ¸ ¾¤ cannot be o®ered
a separating contract but type-g people who are in a pool composed of people
with risk assessment ¾ < ¾¤ can be o®ered a separating contract and the best
separating contract that can be o®ered to them is (X;¼g).
Proof We will prove the Proposition by showing that there is a unique ¾¤ 2
(0;1) that satis¯es the equation x(¾¤) = X: From Lemmas 1 and 2 we know
x(¾ = 1) = L > X. Now consider x(0) which solves
¼
gu(e ¡ ¼
gx(0) ¡ L + x(0)) + (1 ¡ ¼
g)u(e ¡ ¼
gx(0)) = u(e ¡ ¼
bL): (2)
We know that X solves
¼
bu(e ¡ ¼
gX ¡ L + X) + (1 ¡ ¼
b)u(e ¡ ¼
gX) = u(e ¡ ¼
bL): (3)
Since X < L (by Lemma 1), we know that u(e¡¼bL) < u(e¡¼gX)). Therefore,
u(e ¡ ¼bL) being the average of the two terms in (3), it follows that
u(e ¡ ¼
gX(y) ¡ L + X) < u(e ¡ ¼
bL) < u(e ¡ ¼
gX):
Therefore, since (1 ¡ ¼g) > (1 ¡ ¼b),
¼
gu(e ¡ ¼
gX(y) ¡ L + X) + (1 ¡ ¼
g)u(e ¡ ¼
gX) > u(e ¡ ¼
bL): (4)
Hence (2) and (4) imply x(0) < X. By Lemma 2, x(¾) is continuous and mono-
tone in ¾. Therefore there must exist a unique ¾¤ 2 (0;1) such that x(¾¤) = X.
Since X > 0, it follows from Lemma 2 that x(¾) ¡ X is strictly increasing in ¾
at ¾¤.
When x(¾) < X then any contract ( e X;¼g), e X 2 [x(¾);X] is a separating con-
tract. However among the set of separating contracts (X;¼g) gives the highest
utility to type-g people. This follows because u is strictly concave and the insur-
ance is o®ered at a price that is actuarially fair for type-g people.
27¤
To summarize, there is a ¾¤ 2 (0;1) such that people with s0 ¸ ¾¤ can only be o®ered the
full-insurance pooling contract at a price that depends on s0. People with assessment s0 < ¾¤
can be o®ered the opportunity to buy limited insurance at a cheaper price and the most
attractive limited-insurance contract that can be o®ered low-risk type-g agents is X < L at
a price ¼g.
We now proceed to incorporate this logic of pooling and separation into the framework of
the paper. We do this by expanding the set I to include a choice of limited insurance as well.
Speci¯cally, I = f0;X;Lg. That is, we now allow a limited insurance option 0 < X < L,
where X is the most generous limited insurance contract that can be o®ered to people
(when such a contract can be o®ered at all). The set A remains f¡a;0g. In what follows,
Assumptions 1, 3 and 4 will be maintained but Assumption 2 is modi¯ed as follows.
Assumption 2' Type g are Su±ciently Patience and Type b are Su±ciently Impatient
¯
g >
u(e) ¡ u(e ¡ a)



















Proposition 4 Under the Assumptions 1, 2', 3 and 4, the following functions
constitute a competitive equilibrium
² Pricing Functions and Default Probabilities
1. For all ¾, q¤
1(¡a;¾) = ¾=(1 + r), q¤
2(¡a;¾) = 0, and q¤
t(0;¾) = 1=(1 + r)
2. For all ¾, p¤(x;¾) = ¼b ¡ ¾[¼b ¡ ¼g] for x 2 I
3. For all ¾, ¹
g¤
1 (¡a;¾) = 0, ¹b¤
1 (¡a;¾) = 1, and ¹i¤
2 (¡a;¾) = 1.
28² Decision Rules
1. `b¤(µ1) = ¡a for all µ 2 £, `g¤(µ1) = ¡a if µ1 = µ and 0 otherwise, and for all s,
`0i¤(µ2;`;s) = 0.
2. db¤(µ2;`;s) = 1 if ` = ¡a and 0 otherwise, dg¤(µ2;`;s) = 0, and di¤(x;z;`0;s0) = 1.
3. xi¤(`0;s0) = L for s0 ¸ ¾¤, xg¤(`0;s0) = X for s0 < ¾¤, and xb¤(`0;s0) = L for s0 < ¾¤
² Belief-Updating Functions
1. ª¤
1(¡a) = (Á°)=(Á° + 1 ¡ °), ª¤
1(0) = 1
2. For `0 2 f0;¡ag, ª¤
2(0;`0;0;s) = s, ª¤
2(0;`0;¡a;s) = 1, ª¤
2(1;`0;¡a;s) = 0,







> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
s0 if s0 ¸ ¾¤ and x 2 f0;Lg
1 if s0 < ¾¤ and x = X
s0 if s0 < ¾¤ and x = 0
0 if s0 < ¾¤ and x = L
Proof Observe that the only di®erences between the statements of Proposition
2 and 3 is in period 3, namely the decision rule xi¤(`0;s0) and the speci¯cation of
the ª¤
3(x;`0;s0). Therefore, to establish this proposition we only need to establish
two facts. First, the updating function ª¤
3 meets the Bayes' Rule requirements
and, second, that all the decision rules are optimal given the pricing functions
and belief-updating functions.
Consider ¯rst (`0;s0) for which s0 > ¾¤. The decision rules imply that both types
choose x = L. Therefore,
s
0 ¢ 1fxg¤(`0;s0)=Lg + (1 ¡ s
0) ¢ 1fxb¤`0;s0)=Lg = 1
s




0 ¢ 1fxg¤(`0;s0)=0g + (1 ¡ s
0) ¢ 1fxb¤(`0;s0)=0)g = 0
s
0 ¢ 1fxg¤(`0;s0)=0g = 0
These expressions imply that for (`0;s0) such that s0 ¸ ¾¤, ª¤
3(x = L;`0;s0) satis-
¯es the requirements in part 5(c). For x = 0, however, the requirements lead to
an indeterminacy (0/0). We assume that o®-equilibrium choice is uninformative
about a person's type. That is ª¤
3(x = 0;`0;s0) = s0.
Next, consider the case (`0;s) for which s0 < ¾¤. The decision rules imply that
type-g choose x = X and type-b choose x = L. Therefore,
s
0 ¢ 1fxg¤(`0;s0)=Lg + (1 ¡ s
0) ¢ 1fxb¤`0;s0)=Lg = 1 ¡ s
0
s
0 ¢ 1fxg¤(`0;s0)=Lg = 0;
and
s
0 ¢ 1fxg¤(`0;s0)=Xg + (1 ¡ s
0) ¢ 1fxb¤(`0;s0=X)g = s
0
s
0 ¢ 1fxg¤(`0;s0)=X(e)g = s
0;
and for x equal to 0,
s
0 ¢ 1fxg¤(`0;s0)=0g + (1 ¡ s
0) ¢ 1fxb¤(`0;s0)=0)g = 0
s
0 ¢ 1fxg¤(`0;s0)=0g = 0:
These expression imply that the requirements in part 5(c) are met for x = L
and x = X but lead to the indeterminacy (0/0) for x = 0. In the proposed
equilibrium it assumed that ª¤
3(x = 0;`0;s0) = s0.
Now we establish that the decision rules are indeed optimal. We begin with the
decision rules in period 3. Note that Proposition 1 (which is true for any ª¤
3
function) still applies. Hence for `0 < 0, di(x;z;`0;s00) = 1 is still the optimal
30decision. Therefore, using A = f¡a;0g and the insurance pricing p¤(x;¾), a


















x 2 f0;Lg if s
0 > ¾







Consider ¯rst households with s0 ¸ ¾¤. For these households ª¤
3(x;`0;s0) = s0
for x 2 f0;Lg. By Assumption 1 it follows that the optimal insurance choice for
these households, regardless of type, is x = L. Consider next a household with
s0 < ¾¤. If this household chooses x · X then ª¤
3 implies that the household's
s00 = 1. By the pricing function p¤, the household will face the price ¼g. Now
suppose the household is of type-g. Since the price ¼g is actuarially fair for
him, conditional on choosing x · X, it is optimal for him to choose x = X. If
the household is of type-b, then the price ¼g is better than actuarially fair. So,
conditional on choosing x · X, it also optimal for a type-b household to choose
x = X. On the other hand, for any household that chooses x = L; ª¤
3 implies
that the household's s00 = 0. By the pricing function p¤, it follows that the
household will face the price ¼b. Consequently, the choice of insurance reduces
to a choice between the contract (X;¼g) and the contract (L;¼b) regardless of
type. Now we know from Lemma 1 that a type-b person is indi®erent between
these two contracts. And, by Lemma 2 we know that a type-g household with
s0 < ¾¤ strictly prefers the contract (X;¼g) to (L;¼b). Therefore x¤(`0;s0) is the
optimal decision rule.
Next consider the decision rules in period 2. As before, it is weakly optimal for
a household with ` = 0 to choose (d;`0) = (0;0). Consider then a household of
type i with ` = ¡a and assessment s. If this household chooses (d0;`) = (1;0)
31then by the belief-updating function ª¤
2 he would start period 3 with s0 = 0 and
if he chooses (d0;`) = (0;0) then by the belief-updating function he would start
period 3 with s0 = 1. Recognizing that µ2 is always 1 (no preference shocks in




2 (1;¡a;s) = u(e) + ¯
i ¼
gu(e ¡ ¼





2 (1;¡a;s) = u(e ¡ a) + ¯
i u(e ¡ ¼
gL):
By Assumption 2', it follows that the optimal choice for a type-g household with
debt is (d;`0) = (0;0) regardless of s. The utilities for type-b household from
default and no-default are given by
V
b 1
2 (1;¡a;s) = u(e) + ¯




2 (1;¡a;s) = u(e ¡ a) + ¯
i u(e ¡ ¼
gL):
As before, Assumption 2' continues to imply that the optimal choice for a type-b
household with debt is (d;`0) = (1;0) regardless of s. Finally, the proof estab-
lishing that `¤(µ1) is the optimal decision rule is identical to the one given in
Proposition 2 and is therefore not repeated here.
¤
It is worth noting that even though we permitted the insurance industry to o®er separating
contracts when pro¯table, separating contracts are not used in equilibrium. It is still the
case that households choose to reveal their type in the credit market. A fraction (1 ¡ Á) of
type-g households reveal their type in period 1 by choosing not to borrow and the remaining
fraction Á > 0 of type-g households borrow but reveal their type in period 2 by choosing not
to default. All type-b households borrow but reveal their type in period 2 by choosing to
default. Thus by the time people arrive in the insurance market, insurers are fully informed
32about each person's type and competition ensures that each person is o®ered full insurance
at the appropriate actuarially fair price.
Nevertheless the fact that a separating contract could be chosen by a type-g in situations
where such a contract is desirable does have implications for the operation of the credit
market. In particular, when a type-g person contemplates default he is aware that even
though he will arrive in the insurance market with s0 = 0, he does not have to purchase
full insurance at the price ¼b. At that stage he will have the option of purchasing limited
insurance x = X at the price ¼g { an option that is strictly better than purchasing x = L
at the price ¼b. Consequently, the pay-o® from default for a type-g person is higher as
a result of the possibility of separating insurance contracts. This, in turn, means that it
becomes harder to sustain good behavior in the credit market. This fact is evident in the
new Assumption 2' { the term on the r.h.s in the inequality for ¯g is now larger relative
to the corresponding term in Assumption 2. Given a value of ¯g, there are values for a {
the loan size{ for which Assumption 2 is satis¯ed but not Assumption 2'. Therefore, the
possibility of separating contracts in the insurance market reduces the set of loan sizes for
which it is possible to sustain debt.
7 Conclusion
As the argument in Propositions 2 and 4 make clear, the logic of debt repayment in this
model relies on two things { the good types (type g) have a lower probability of loss and
therefore have an incentive to separate themselves from the type b in the insurance market
(this is why \looking good" is valuable to the good types) and the bad types (type b) do not
have an incentive to mimic the good types because the rewards to \looking good" come in
the future and the bad types do not care su±ciently about the future.
In closing we comment on a wider motivation for considering problems of the sort analyzed
in this paper. The fundamental aspect of our environment is that people have private in-
33formation about some personal characteristics that are relevant to their trading partners.
We know from previous work that in such environments with adverse selection, competitive
equilibria need not exist and even if one exists it need not be Pareto Optimal. Yet, there
is little doubt that both lenders and insurers view adverse selection as one of their most
challenging business problem. More broadly, the issue of adverse selection arises in many
exchange contexts. We view this paper as taking a modest step in the direction of formulat-
ing adverse selection problems in the language of recursive competitive equilibrium. In this
regard, we believe that separating the \learning problem" which is characteristic of these
environments from the \equilibrium pricing problem" is conceptually useful. The examples
worked out in this paper illustrate how we can use the recursive belief-updating functions
to accomplish this separation. In our companion work (Chatterjee et. al.(2005b)) we are
using this approach to analyze unsecured borrowing and lending with adverse selection in a
more standard in¯nite-horizon macro model. We have found that under certain conditions
competitive equilibria exist and can be computed. Furthermore the equilibrium has prop-
erties that match the data { for instance, interest rates depend negatively on credit scores
and people who default see their credit scores decline.
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